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1 Introduction
This article examines the relationship between migrants’ remittances and the prevalence
of child labor by using a large sample of developing countries. In particular, we investigate
whether the inflows of remittances help to offset the effects of financial constraints and in-
come shocks on the prevalence of child labor. Starting from a simple theoretical model, then
based on a sample of 97 developing countries (of which 31 are African) observed over the
period 1998-2002, we show that remittances reduce significantly child labor in developing
countries characterized by weak financial systems and by strong income instability. These
results were robust even after taking into account the potential endogeneity of remittances
and financial development in the regressions. Policy recommendations for specific strate-
gies to facilitate receipt of remittances by households are more than ever appropriate for
a region like Sub-Saharan Africa, which currently receives a small fraction of these funds
compared to other developing countries, and where the prevalence of child labor is still a
serious issue.
The question and our results are important for a number of reasons. First, the problem
of child labor is a crucial issue for economic development in the extent to which this strategy
has irreversible consequences. Indeed, it is generally difficult for children who have early
left school to embrace life to return even if the economy has improved. Just as children who
are forced to work several times a week while going to school may have more difficulty than
others in the training. In addition, for regions like sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, the
issue of child labor is important in terms of extremely high prevalence rates observed in
these two regions (See Figure 1 in Appendix 1). Second, remittances are one of the most
visible dimension of the current globalization. The World Bank estimates for example to
251 billion U.S. dollar, the amount of remittances in the world in 2007. Developing countries
are the main recipient of these funds which are rapidly growing and whose characteristics
and effects have been studied in several aspects. First, remittances are less volatile than
other capital flows to developing countries (See Graph 4 in Appendix 1). Second, they now
exceed the volume of official development assistance received by developing countries (See
Graph 3 in Appendix 1). Finally, remittances do not pass through government budgets,
and arrive directly in the pockets of households. While developing countries are the main
recipients of these funds, we note that remittances in sub-Saharan Africa represent only
1.5% of GDP in the region compared to the most important figures in other parts of the
development world (See Figure 2 in Appendix 1).
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Several studies have shown the role of remittances in reducing poverty (Adams & Page,
2005; Gupta et al., 2009), promotion of education in the families (Edwards & Ureta, 2003),
promotion of entrepreneurship (Woodruff & Zenteno, 2007), economic growth (Giuliano &
Ruiz-Arranz, 2008; Catrinescu et al., 2009) and reduction of inequalities (Koechlin & Leon,
2007; Chauvet &Mesplé-Somps, 2007). While the development potential of remittance flows
is increasingly being recognized by researchers and policymakers, the effect of remittances
on child labor at the cross-country level remains unexplored. This paper is a first effort to
try to fill this gap in the literature.
The main reasons usually put forward to explain the prevalence of child labor are :
household poverty (Krueger, 1996), income shocks (Beegle et al., 2006; Guarcello et al.,
2003; Duryea et al., 2007) and financial constraints(Ranjan, 1999, 2001; Dehejia & Gatti,
2005). At the same time, recent work on remittances has highlighted their importance as
a vehicle for poverty reduction, as a substitute for inefficient or nonexistent credit markets
and as an insurance mechanism. One of the main contributions of this paper is to link
the literature on remittances and child labor and show how remittances could mitigate the
impact of the main determinants of child labor in developing countries.
If we take for example the result of micro and macroeconomic studies which conclude
that remittances reduce poverty, it is therefore understandable that remittances may reduce
child labor through a reduction of poverty in countries. Remittances can also be more
effective in reducing child labor as the country and thus households are hit by major
shocks. Based on one of the conclusions of the recent literature (Kapur & McHale, 2005;
Yang & Choi, 2007; Halliday, 2006) which concludes that remittances tend to rise when
the recipient economy suffers a downturn in activity, an economic crisis, natural disaster,
or political conflict, we understands that remittances may reduce child labor through their
stabilizer impact. Finally, based on the results of the study conducted by Giuliano &
Ruiz-Arranz (2008), which concludes that remittances act as a substitute for inefficient
or nonexistent credit markets by providing an alternative way to finance investment and
helping overcome liquidity constraints, we can therefore consider that remittances will be
most effective in terms of reducing child labor when an economy have a low level of financial
development. In other words, remittances mitigate the impact of financial constraints on
the prevalence of child labor.
This study is a continuation of papers that were interested in econometric analysis
of determinants of child labor at the macroeconomic level (Drenovsky, 1992; Shelburne,
2001; Cigno et al., 2002; Edmonds & Pavcnik, 2006; Neumayer & De Soysa, 2005; Davies
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& Voy, 2009; Dehejia & Gatti, 2005). The six first studies analyzed the impact of trade
liberalization and foreign direct investment on the prevalence of child labor and led for
the most part, a negative effect of trade and financial openness on child labor. Dehejia &
Gatti (2005) have analyzed the effect of financial development and variability of income
on child labor. They have concluded that financial development reduces the prevalence of
child labor while the variability of income increases it, and that financial development helps
to mitigate the impact of income variability.
But we must be cautious when estimating the causal impact of remittances and of
financial development on the prevalence of child labor because of the endogeneity of these
two variables. For example, the positive reverse causality between remittances and child
labor (remittances increase if child labor increases) will result in an underestimation of
the effect of remittances on child labor. Just as the endogeneity of financial development
may be due to omitted variables that may simultaneously affect the prevalence of child
labor and the quality of financial institutions. The endogeneity problem may also be due
to measurement error. The coefficient of financial development may also be biased to the
extent that those countries with developed financial systems may also be those for which
data on child labor are well measured.
We try to solve these problems by using the instrumental variables estimators. Remit-
tances for each country are instrumented by the coastal area of a country (defined as the
ratio of the area within 100 KM from a sea or an ocean to the total area of the country),
by the existence a dual exchange rate regime and the distance between this country and
the main destination of his international migrants. These variables have been used in the
recent literature as exogenous determinants of remittances in developing countries (Abdih
et al., 2008; Freund & Spatafora, 2008; Gupta et al., 2009). The level of financial develop-
ment measured by the ratio of bank credit as a percentage of GDP is instrumented by the
creditors rights and by the existence of a credit registries. As demonstrated by Djankov
et al. (2007), securing the rights of creditors and the sharing of financial information on
the indebtedness of borrowers are fundamental determinants of the allocation of credit in
an economy.
Econometric analysis are conducted on variables evaluated at their average for the
period 1998-2002. We test the robustness of our results by applying the Tobit estimator
methods applied for instrumental variables to overcome the bias that might result from the
fact that child labor is censored at zero for some countries. The results are not influenced
by the estimator used.
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of pre-
vious work on the topic of the relationship between migration, remittances and child labor.
Section 3 is devoted to building a theoretical model of the relationship between finan-
cial constraints, income shocks, remittances and child labor. Section 4 is devoted to the
construction of the econometric model, the presentation of the variables used in this article
and estimation method. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 tests the robustness of
results. We conclude in Section 7.
2 Literature review
We present an overview of the main findings of empirical work which have examined
the relationship between remittances and child labor in developing countries. This section
is build partially on the literature review made by Calero et al. (2008).
Several studies have found evidence that remittances and international migration are
associated with increased educational attainment and reduction in child labor supply. For
example, using migration networks and household migration history as instruments for
remittances, for El Salvador, Acosta (2006) finds that girls and boys under 14-years-old from
recipient families are more likely to attend school than those from non-recipient households,
while remittances also seem to reduce child labor supply. In a similar vein, also based
on data from El Salvador, Edwards & Ureta (2003) find that remittances reduce school
dropout hazard rates. Borraz (2005) instruments remittances using historical migration
patterns and distance to the United States and finds that remittances have a positive but
small effect on schooling for boys and girls with low educated mothers and who reside in
cities with less than 2,500 inhabitants. Hanson & Woodruff (2003) use migration patterns
to instrument migration and find that having a migrated family member has a positive
effect on educational outcomes for girls in Mexico (aged 10–15) whose mothers have a
very low level of education. Using a similar empirical strategy, Mansuri (2006) finds strong
positive effects of temporary economic migration on investments in children’s schooling in
Pakistan, especially for girls.
Yang (2008)uses the Asian currency crisis to map out how variations in remittance
receipts affect education and child labor in the Philippines. He uses the fact that the ma-
gnitude of the economic shock differed across Philippine recipient families depending on the
5
host country of the family’s emigrating members (because of differences in currency depre-
ciation). Exploiting this variation across households he concludes that favorable economic
shocks (which he translates into greater remittance flows) increases educational invest-
ments in girl children and decreases the number of hours worked by boy children. Milligan
& Bohara (2007) show that in the case of Nepal, remittance income from international
sources positively contributes to child welfare, but much less so than the same amount of
income from other sources.
Dimova et al. (2008)examines the extent to which migration and remittances may re-
duce child labor even in households that do not participate in the migration and therefore
do not receive remittances. They argue that the reduction of the amount of labor available
in the aftermath of migration and the remittances sent by emigrating parents may enable
not only the children, but also other family members to stop working. The wage increase
emanating from the fall in labor supply may then make it possible for parents to withdraw
their children from the labor force. The authors successfully tested this hypothesis on panel
data from several surveys of Tanzanian households. Calero et al. (2008) investigates how
remittances via transnational networks affect human capital investments through relaxing
resource constraints and facilitate households in consumption smoothing by reducing vul-
nerability to economic shocks. By using micro data for Ecuador, they show that remittances
increase school enrollment and decrease incidence of child work, especially for girls and in
rural areas. Furthermore, they find that aggregate shocks are associated with increased
work activities, while remittances are used to finance education when households are faced
with these shocks.
However, other findings present mixed results of the effect of migration and remittances.
In a study on 11 Latin American countries, Acosta et al. (2007) find that remittances are
associated with increased educational attainment in only six countries (Nicaragua, Gua-
temala, Honduras, Ecuador, Haiti, and El Salvador), the effect being larger for children
whose mothers have a low level of education. Similarly, using historical migration rates
to instrument current migration, McKenzie & Rapoport (2006) find a negative effect of
migration on schooling attendance and education attainment among 16–18-year-old girls
and 12–18-year-old boys, but a positive effect for younger girls with uneducated mothers
in rural Mexico. They attribute these outcomes to side effects of migration. For instance,
the absence of parents in the household due to migration could lead to reduced investment
in their children’s education and an increase in the incidence of child work. Relying on
rainfall data as instrument for remittances, Lopez-Cordova (2004) shows that these effects
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are especially relevant for secondary school age children in Mexico, as receiving remittances
positively affect school attendance for children aged 6–14, but negatively for boys and girls
aged 15–17.
3 The theoretical model
We now turn to the theoretical model of the relationship between remittances, financial
constraints, shocks and child labor. Our model is similar to those of Baland & Robinson
(2000), Rogers & Swinnerton (2004) and Dustmann & Speciale (2005).
There are N identical households in the economy. Each family consists of a child and
an adult. The model is built on two periods, t = 1, 2. The discount rate is given by β with
0 < β ≤ 1. We assume further that the parent works only in the first period and supplies
one unit of labor which has value of A1 (with A1 ≥ 1). We assume that the household
starts with an initial level of wealth (which may come from the inheritance, and consists of
farmland or livestock), which is valued at A0. It follows that the parent’s income in the first
period is the sum of income from his job and his inheritance A = A0 + A1. At time t = 1
children may also work. Time not spent working is spent in school. The time children spend
at work has a value of 1 (in efficiency units). The child has a unit time endowment. In the
first period parents decide how to allocate their children’s unit time endowment between
labour (l) or schooling (1−l). The only cost to acquire education is an opportunity cost. In
the second period, children become adults and they supply one unit of labour, which has
value h [1− l]. Following Baland & Robinson (2000) and Rogers & Swinnerton (2004), the
function h [1− l] has the following properties : h [0] = 1, h′ [1− l] > 0, h′′ [1− l] < 0.
Let c1 and c2 be the household consumption in the first and second period, respectively.
The household utility function is assumed to be separable :
W (c1, c2) = U (c1) + βU (c2) (1)
The function W is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
concave. We distinguish in this analysis, three possible cases : (1) the credit market works,
(2) the credit market does not work and (3) the household faces uncertainty (risk) on pa-
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rent first period income.
3.1 Credit market case
In the first best situation, households can borrow and lend freely in the credit market.
To simplify notation, let the interest rate be equal to zero. Parents decide the optimal
allocation of their children’s unit time endowment between labour (l) or schooling (1−l)
and the optimal value of saving (s) :
maxl,sU (c1) + βU (c2) (2)
c1 = A+ l +R (1− l)− s
c2 = h [1− l] + s
where R is remittances which is targeted to “buy” children’s education (more precisely,
to cover a fraction R of the opportunity cost of schooling, where (0 < R ≤ 1). The first
order conditions with respect to l and s are respectively :
(1−R)U ′ (c1) = βh′ [1− l]U ′ (c2)
U ′ (c1) = βU ′ (c2)
The first-best children’s time allocation between labour and schooling is such that :
h′ [1− l] = 1−R (3)
By implicit function theorem on h′ [1− l] − 1 + R = 0, we can analyze the impact of





h′′ [1− l] < 0 (4)
We concludes that child labor decreases with remittances. What happens when there
is no credit market ?
3.2 No credit market case
Household problem is given by :
maxl,sU (c1) + βU (c2) (5)
c1 = A+ l +R (1− l)
c2 = h [1− l]
First order condition with respect to l lead to :
(1−R)U ′ (c1) = βh′ [1− l]U ′ (c2)
Childen’s time allocation between labor and schooling is such that :
h′ [1− l] = (1−R)U ′ (c1)
βU ′ (c2)
(6)
By implicit function theorem on h′ [1− l]− (1−R)U ′(c1)βU ′(c2) = 0, we get the impact of remit-
tances on child labor when there is no credit market :
dl
dR
= U ′ (c1)
βU ′ (c2)h′′ [1− l]
< 0 (7)
with h′′ [1− l] < 0.
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When we compare expression 7 with the expression in 4, we see that remittances impact
on child labor when there is no credit market is higher than impact when there is a credit
market. Thus, the marginal impact of remittances on child labor reduction decreases with
the level of financial development. Now, we look what happen if parent’s income in the
first period is uncertain.
3.3 Remittances, income shocks and child labor
We assume now that household faces a risk1 on the parent’s income in the first period.
In this case, A becomes stochastic and follows a distribution with a mean equal to Am and
with a variance σ2. We write the household probem as follow :
maxlEU (c1) + βU (c2) (8)
c̃1 = Ã+ l +R (1− l)
c2 = h [1− l]
with E, the operator of mathematical expectation.
A second order Taylor’s expansion around Am lead to the following expression of the
expected utility function :
maxlU (Am + l +R (1− l)) + βU (h [1− l]) +
1
2σ
2U ′′ (Am + l +R (1− l)) (9)
First order condition with respect to l gives :









1This risk faced by household could be climatic shocks which destroy livestock or reduces the harvest.
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2U ′′′ (c1) + U ′ (c1)
βU ′ (c2)h′′ [1− l]
< 0 (11)
with U ′′′ (c1) > 0 when the parent is prudent.
We can conclude that the greater the risk to the parent’s income is high, the greater
the impact of remittances on the reduction of child labor.
To sum, the theoretical model proposed in this article predicts two importants things.
In fact, the marginal impact of remittances on child labor reduction : (1) decreases with
the access to financial services and (2) increases with the riskiest nature of the environment
in which households evolves.
4 Econometric analysis
4.1 Econometric models
We build an econometric model with the aim to test the theoretical hypotheses formula-
ted in this study. More precisely, we verifies that the marginal impact migrants’ remittances
increases with the inefficiency of the credit market as well as the severity of the shocks faced
by households.
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4.1.1 An econometric equation of the relationship between remittances, fi-
nancial development and child labor
We specify the following equation :
ChildLabi = α+X ′iβ + θ1FDi + θ2Ri + θ3 (Ri × FDi) + εi (12)
where ChildLab, X, FD and R represents respectively the prevalence of child labor,
matrix of controls variables, level of financial development and remittances. ε is an error
term and the index i reflects the country. We expects that θ1 < 0, θ2 < 0 and θ3 > 0.
We follows Dehejia & Gatti (2005) for the choice of controls variables. We controls for
the level of economic development proxied by GDP per capita, for the globalization of the
economies (proxied by trade openess), for the importance of rural population and finally for
importance of agriculture in the country. We add also the migration share in this equation
as control variable to ensure that we really measure the impact of remittances not that
of migration on child labor2. We control also for the level of child labor in 1960, for the
quality of domestic institutions (law and order) as well as for regional dummies.
4.1.2 An econometric equation of the relationship between remittances, in-
come shocks and child labor
Do migrants’ remittances reduces the most child labor in a context of income instabi-
lity ? For answer this question, we specifiy the following model :
ChildLabi = α+X ′iβ + γ1FDi + γ2Ri + γ3Shi + γ4 (Ri × Shi) + εi (13)
2 Data on migration rates are drawn from United Nations and they concern the year 2000.
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where Sh is the shock variable. Our hypothesis will be verified if on the one hand,
income variability is a significant determinant of the prevalence child labor (γ3 > 0) and
on the other hand, if remittances mitigates the effect of income shocks (γ4 < 0). The same
previous controls variables will be introduced this model.
4.2 Data
We measure the extent of child labor as the percentage of the population in the 10–14-
year-old age range that is actively engaged in work. These data were compiled by the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and are available at 10-year intervals, beginning
in 1950 for 172 countries. “Active population” includes people who worked (for wage or
salary, in cash or in kind, as well as for family unpaid work) for at least 1 hour during the
reference period (International Labour Organisation 1996). The structure of the data does
not allow us to infer the intensity of child labor, so we cannot distinguish between light
work (which some might argue is beneficial for adolescents) and fulltime labor, which might
seriously conflict with human capital accumulation. Moreover, like most official statistics on
child labor, these data are likely to suffer from underreporting, because work by children is
illegal or restricted by law in most countries, and children often are employed in agriculture
or the informal sector. These problems notwithstanding, the ILO data have the advantage
of being carefully adjusted on the basis of internationally accepted definitions, thereby
allowing cross-country comparisons over time (Ashagrie, 1993). Child labor data for the
period 1998-2002 are taken from World Bank Development Indicators (2004).
While it may naturally be tempted to use appropriate estimators to capture the dimen-
sion of panel data (for example, the fixed effects estimator) in the regressions, Edmonds
and Pavcnik (2006) noted that only few developing countries have data on the prevalence
of child labor over several years. Otherwise, much of the intertemporal variation in child
labor in the ILO data is thus driven by the imputations and adjustments done by ILO
rather than independent observations on child labor based on household surveys. Hence,
when most countries have one independent observation on child labor, inclusion of a coun-
try fixed effect leads to identification based solely on ILO imputations rather than actual
changes in child labor. Moreover, as we subsequently discuss, our empirical framework does
not require panel data for identification. An another argument could justify our empirical
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framework. Most of exogenous determinants of financial development and remittances pro-
posed by the recent literature, are constants over the time (creditor rights, credit registries,
coastal area, distance or dual exchange rate regime). Thus, in an instrumental variables
estimation, we cannot introduce country fixed-effects3.
Remittances data are drawn from the World Bank database (World Development In-
dicators, 2008). This variable include three categories : “unrequited transfers” which refer
to money sent by migrants to family and friends to the home country, “migrant transfers”
which are equal to the net worth of the migrants (considered here as individual’s change
of residence for at least one year) and finally “compensation of employees” which represent
funds sent back by temporary workers who work abroad for less than a year. This database
provides informations for a lot of countries and over a long period. We use in our estima-
tion the ratio of remittances received by the home country on its GDP. We have to bear in
mind the fact that this remittances data underestimates the effective volume received by
households in developing countries, this volumes which transites through informal chan-
nels. But, this World bank’s data are commonly used by several authors in the studies of
remittances at the macro-economic level.
Financial development is measured as the ratio of domestic credit to private sector
provided by deposit banks. This series are drawn from the data base compiled annually by
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt et Levine for the World Bank. The choice of this variable to proxy the
level of financial development is justified by two importants reasons. On the one hand, the
dimension of financial intermediation in which we are interested is the capacity of banks to
provide funds to households or firms. On the other hand, the variables retained as exogenous
instruments for financial development are more pertinent if financial development is proxied
by the credit ratio.
In this paper, income shocks are measured by the instability of GDP per capita. In
fact, several approaches are possible to measure instability. What makes the difference
between these approaches is the hypothesis made on the nature of the long term trend.
One can postulate the existence of a pure stochastic trend in the logarithm of GDP per
capita. Instability is then given by the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate.
One could also assume a pure deterministic trend. In this case, instability is given by the
3Remittances and financial development could be instrumented by their respectives lags. While using
lagged values of the regressors as instruments can help deal with the problem of reverse causality, it does
not address biases arising due to measurement error, since lagged values of the regressors are likely to suffer
from this problem as well.
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standard deviation of the residual from a regression of the logarithm of GDP per capita on
a linear tend. The inconvenient of these two approaches is the a priori choice made on the
nature of the trend. This problem is strenghtened in the case of panel data in which the
nature of the trend could vary across the units of observations. To overcome these pitfalls,
a solution is given by the construction of a mixed trend which combines a stochastic trend
with a deterministic trend for the same serie. In this paper, we build the instability of
GDP per capita from a mixed trend. The trend is estimated from a global adjustment over
the whole period 1960-2002. But for the purpose of comparison, we retain also as measure
of income variability, the standard deviation of GDP per capita growth rate. The two
instability variables are constructed alternatively for a 5-years period or 10-years period.











where ŷit is the fitted value of yit from the following regression for each country over
the whole period 1960-2002 :
yit = ai + biyit−1 + cit+ ζit
GDP per capita chain series are drawn from Penn World Tables 6.2. For the other
explanatory variables used in this paper, the definitions, sources and descriptives statistics
are available in Appendix 3.
4.3 Econometric Methods
Two distincts econometrics methods are used for the estimation of the parameters.
We begins by ordinarly least squared (OLS) and given the fact that our interest expla-
natory variables are suspected to be endogenous (remittances, financial development and
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the interaction terms) we estimate the models with instrumental variables techniques (IV)4.
4.3.1 Identification strategy of the causal impact of migrants’ remittances
Finding an appropriate instrument or set of instruments that corrects for the endo-
geneity of remittances has been a challenge for researchers. Two key features govern the
selection of an instrument for remittances : the instrument must be correlated with remit-
tances, and its effect on individual country prevalence of child labor must operate solely
through its impact on remittances or through the effect on other variables we already
control. In this paper, remittances are instrumented by three variables.
The first instrument is the coastal area of a country (defined as the ratio of the area
within 100 KM from a sea or an ocean to the total area of the country). This variable has
been used for the instrumentation of remittances in a recent work by Abdih et al. (2008).
The reason for the observed correlation between the coastal area and remittances is clearly
through emigration. A higher coastal area is generally associated with a higher ratio of
emigrants to the total population, which for obvious reasons leads to higher remittances
on average. One problem with this instrument is that it may be correlated with other
determinant of child labor like trade openess, institutional quality, urbanization rate or
regional dummy. However, we control in regressions for these variables. Another problem
may arise from the correlation between coastal area and migration and the correlation
between migration and child labor. Migration could affect the pravalence of child labor by
at least two channels. Firstly, migration can induce an incitation for the accumulation of
human capital (the brain gain hypothesis) and thus, reduces the incidence of child labor.
Secondly, migration alters the demographic structure of households. In consequence, there
is more ressources per capita in the household which permit education funding. We then
controlled in all regressions, for the direct impact of migration on child labor. Coastal area
data are drawn from the works of Gallup et al. (1999).
4Several authors in micro-econometric studies on the remittances-child labor relationship, have instru-
mented migrrants’ remittances by historical migration rates, by the existence of migrants’ networks and
by the presence of Money Tranfer Operators in the region of interest (Acosta, 2006; Acosta et al., 2007;
Hanson & Woodruff, 2003; Mansuri, 2006; McKenzie & Rapoport, 2006; Calero et al., 2008).
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The second instrumental variable is the distance between a developing country and the
main destination country of its international migrants. More important is the distance,
the less the volume of remittances received. This variable was chosen as instrument for
migrants remittances in a recent paper by Gupta et al. (2009).
The last instrumental variable is an indicator of the presence of a dual exchange rate in
a country. This binary indicator specifies if a country has more than one exchange rate that
may be used simultaneously for different purposes and/or by different entities. It comes
from the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions,
ARREAR (2003). This variable proved to be an important determinant of remittances in
a recent paper by Freund & Spatafora (2008).
4.3.2 Identification strategy of the causal impact of financial development
Two variables are chosen as instruments for financial development (proxied by the ratio
of credit to private sector). They are creditors rights and binary variable on the existence
of public (i.e., government-owned) and private credit registries in different countries. These
registries collect information on credit histories and current indebtedness of various borro-
wers and share it with lenders.
Djankov et al. (2007) have shown that the level of creditors right is an important de-
terminant of private credit. In fact, when lenders can more easily force repayment, grab
collateral, or even gain control of the firm, they are more willing to extend credit. They
have also shown that what matters for lending is information. When lenders know more
about borrowers, their credit history, or other lenders to the firm, they are not as concer-
ned about the lemons problem of financing nonviable projects and therefore extend more
credit. We think that these two variables are a good exclusion restrictions in the sense
that we cannot consider that information-sharing or creditors right may be directly lin-
ked to child labor prevalence other than through their respectives impacts on private credit.
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4.3.3 Instrumentation techniques in the case of non-linear terms in endoge-
nous regressors
We present the technique chosen for the instrumentation of endogenous regressors in a
non-linear equation. We specify the following model :
ChildLabi = α+X ′iβ + θ1FDi + θ2Ri + θ3 (Rit × FDi) + εi (15)
In this model, we suspect remittances and financial development (R and FD) to be
endogenous. However, the interaction between remittances and financial development
(R × FD) is also endogenous. Let Z1 and Z2 be the vector for excluded instruments of
remittances and financial development respectively. The set of instruments for (R × FD)
is the various interactions of the elements in Z1 and the elements in Z2. We then consider
the following first-stage equations:
Ri = αR +X ′iβR + Z ′2iθR1 + Z ′1iθR2 + (Z2i × Z1i)′ θR3 + εRi (16)
FDi = αFD +X ′iβFD + Z ′2iθFD1 + Z ′1iθFD2 + (Z2i × Z1i)′ θFD3 + εFDi (17)
(Ri × FDi) = αRFD +X ′iβRFD + Z ′2iθRFD1 + Z ′1iθRFD2 + (Z2i × Z1i)′ θRFD3 + εRFDi (18)
Although this strategy is appropriate, the risk is to see the first stage equations with a
lot of instruments (the additive and multiplicative terms), what could produce an overfit
problem. For example if the vectors Z1 and Z2 contains respectively two variables, we
obtain first stage equation with eight instruments! As a result of Wooldridge (2002), we
can render things compact by adopting another strategy. As a first step, we regress each
of the variables R and FD on the set of included and excluded instruments:
Ri = αR +X ′iβR + Z ′2iθR1 + Z ′1iθR2 + εRi (19)
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FDi = αFD +X ′iβFD + Z ′2iθFD1 + Z ′1iθFD2 + εFDi (20)
We obtain the predictions of the endogenous variables, named respectively R̂i and F̂Di.
We construct also a new variable R̂i × F̂Di. Finally, we estimate the structural model of
child labor with instrumental variables techniques in which, remittances, financial develop-
ment and the interaction of the two are instrumented by R̂i, F̂Di and R̂i × F̂Di5.
5 Estimations results
We presents the results of the impact of remittances on child labor which depends on
the level of financial development and the importance of income shocks. OLS and IV-GMM
results are presented side by side for the purpose of comparison. Results with the Tobit
estimator applied for instrumental variables are also presented.
5.1 Remittances, financial development and child labor (OLS and IV-
GMM results)
We begins by the predictions of remittances, financial development and we interact this
predictions. These predictions are obtained from a regression of remittances and financial
development on all the included and excluded instruments and on regional dummies. The
results of these regressions are shown in Table 2 in Appendix. In line with our expectations,
all the coefficients of the instruments retained have the correct sign and in the majority of
cases, they are statistically significant (columns 1 and 2, Table 2). We then use the fitted
values of remittances and financial development to construct a third variable, precisely,
5This approach is also chosen for the estimation of the parameters in the model of child labor which
includes income shocks. However, we assume that income shocks are exogenous, in this case only remittances,
financial development and the product of remittances with income shocks are instrumented.
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the product of the two predictions. All these three predictions are used as instrumental
variables for the endogenous regressors in the structural model of child labor. Estimations
are realized by the generalized method of moments (IV-GMM). Results are shown in Table
3.
The first two columns show the first-stage results only for remittances and financial
development. The third column presents OLS results and finally, the last column presents
the results obtained with IV-GMM. We note that the coefficient of remittances, financial
development and the interaction of the two are not statistically significant in the case
of OLS regressions (column 3). However, when we control for the endogeneity of these
variables with instrumental variables, we obtain a significant impact with the expected
signs (column 4). When we look at the results of column 4, we see that the coefficients of
controls variables have the expected sign and the more important, the marginal impact of
remittances on child labor reduction decreases with the level of financial development.
Perhaps a better sense of the quantitative significance of the impact of migrants’ re-
mittances can be obtained from the following calculation based on the results of column
4. A one standard-deviation increase in remittances ratio (5,64) is associated with a 18%
decrease in child labor relative to the mean (13,47%) for a developing country with a cre-
dit ratio which corresponds to the 25th percentile of the distribution of the variable (9,19%).
5.2 Remittances, income shocks and child labor (OLS and IV-GMM re-
sults)
As we have doing in the previous analysis, we estimate the model by OLS and by
IV-GMM. The equations used to generate the fitted values of remittances and financial de-
velopment are presented in Table 4. We use the predicted value of remittances to construct
a third variable, the interaction of the predicted value of remittances with the shocks va-
riables. We then use these variables as instruments for remittances, financial development
and the product of remittances with the four measures of income shocks in the structural
model of child labor. Results are presented in Table 6. The effective first-stage regressions
are shown in Table 5. Income shocks are measured alternatively as the deviation from a
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mixed trend or as the standard-deviation of the GDP per capita growth rate. The periods
retained to compute instability are alternatively 5 and 10 years.
In the quasi-totality of regressions, the estimated coefficients of remittances and re-
mittances in interaction with the different measure of income shocks are lower in absolute
value in the OLS regressions than in IV-GMM regressions. More importantly, the estimated
coefficient of remittances when the variable enters additively is statistically significant and
positive while the coefficient of the interaction terms are negative and statistically siginifi-
cant in all columns. Whatever how income instability is measured (standard-deviation of
the residuals, standard-deviation of GDP per capita growth rate, instability over 5 years
or over 10 years), our regressions lead to the following result : the marginal impact of
migrants’ remittances on child labor reduction increases with the intensity of shocks faced
by countries.
On the basis on the results of column 4 of the Table 6, we can quantify the impact
of remittances on child labor in a context of income instability. A one standard-deviation
increase in remittances ratio is associated with a 13% decrease in child labor relative to
the mean for a developing country with a level of income shock which corresponds to the
75th percentile of the distribution of the variable (5,12%).
6 Robustness check : IV-Tobit results
In the sample we use, there is a non-negligeable number of countries for which the serie
of the prevalence of child labor is censored at 0. Precisely, there are 15 countries which
are concerned. It could be a serious problem in the sense that the estimators used before
gives biased results when the dependent variable is censored at a certain value. To solve
this problem, we retain the Tobit estimator applied to instrumental variables procedure.
Results are presented in Table 7.
There are broadly the same results as before. In column 1, we note that the coefficient
of remittances is negative and statistically significant while the coefficient of the product of
migrants’ remittances with the credit ratio is positive. This result confirms the hypothesis
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of a decreasing impact of remittances with the level of financial development. When we
turn on the models with income shocks, we get the same results as in the IV-GMM re-
gressions : the marginal impact of remittances increases with the intensity of shocks faced
by developing countries. Finally, all the coefficient of our interest variables estimated by
IV-Tobit are similar in value, than those obtained with the IV-GMM.
7 Concluding remarks
Workers’ remittances, flows received from migrant workers residing abroad, have be-
come the second largest source of external finance for developing countries in recent years.
In addition to their increasing size, the stability of these flows despite financial crises and
economic downturns make them a reliable source of funds for developing countries. While
the development potential of remittance flows is increasingly being recognized by resear-
chers and policymakers, the effect of remittances on child labor at the cross-country level
remains unexplored.
This paper is a first effort to try to fill this gap in the literature. We have tested the
hypothesis that remittances are more effective when the constraints faced by households of
these countries are high. On the basis of a large sample of developing countries observed over
the period 1998-2002, we have shown that the marginal impact of migrants’ remittances
on child labor increases with the levels of financial constraints and the intensity of income
shocks. These results are robust to using different estimation techniques and accounting
for endogeneity biases arising from omitted factors, reverse causation, and measurement
error.
Our results suggest that all strategies to facilitate the inflow of remittances in these
countries are important for the accumulation of child human capital and a reduction in
the prevalence of child labor. Such a policies have distinct advantages over other reme-
dies. Compared with legal restrictions and direct bans, it can decrease child labor without
lowering household welfare, and it is arguably a simpler goal than general economic de-
velopment and can have a more immediate impact. There would be substantial potential
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benefits to the world’s poor if more international attention were focused on integrating
‘‘migration policy” within the larger global dialogue on economic development and po-
verty reduction. With respect to remittances, the international community needs to take
efforts to reduce the current high transaction costs of remitting money to labor-exporting
countries. At present, high transaction costs resulting from lack of competition, regulation,
and/or low levels of financial sector performance in labor-exporting countries act as a type
of regressive tax on international migrants, who often tend to be poor and to remit small
amounts of money with each remittance transaction. Lowering the transactions costs of
remittances will help to increase the economic development-increasing impact of interna-
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Appendix 1 : Stylized facts on remittances, financial develop-
ment and the prevalence of child labor in developing countries
Graph 1 : Prevalence of child labor, financial development and agricultural instability in the
developing world
Note : EAP = East Asia and Pacific, ECA=Europe and Central Asia, LAC=Latin America and Car-
ribean, MENA= Middle East and North Africa, SA=South Asia, SSA= Sub-saharan Africa
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Graph 2 : Remittances trends since 1980 in developing regions
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Graph 3 : Workers’ Remittances and Other Inflows to Developing Countries
Graph 4 : Volatility of Inflows to Developing Countries (1980-2006)










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Prediction of remittances and private credit
Dependent variables
remittances crédit
Child labor 1960 -0.0260 0.102
(-0.479) (0.519)
International migration stock (% population) 2000 0.107 0.410
(1.126) (1.135)
GDP per capita 1998 (log) -1.921 10.26**
(-1.603) (2.270)
Rural population (%) 0.0435 0.285
(0.749) (1.342)
Agricultural production per capita 1990 (log) 5.488 -0.0544
(1.234) (-0.00338)










Credit registries -0.760 11.93**
(-0.527) (2.314)




Number of observations 88 86
R2 0.427 0.641
Note : t-statistics in parentheses. lc100km : Ratio of coastal area (area within 100km of sea/ocean ) to total area. ldist : logarithm
of the distance beteween a developing country i and a country j which contains the largest share of country i’s migrant workers. dexrt :
binary indicator specifies if a country has more than one exchange rate that may be used simultaneously for different purposes and/or
by different entities. Credit registries : The variable equals one if either a public registry or a private bureau operates in the country,
zero otherwise. Creditor rights : An index aggregating creditor rights. The index ranges from 0 (weak creditor rights) to 4 (strong
creditor rights). remittances : Remittances in percentage of GDP. Crédit : Private credit by deposit banks in percentage of GDP.
Regional dummies are included in all regressions but they are not reported in the table. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Remittances, financial development and child labor: Results with migration
Dependent variable: Child labor First Stage OLS IV-GMM
remittances credit 3 4
Child labor 1960 0.00973 0.0444 0.462*** 0.481***
(0.307) (0.279) (7.426) (7.559)
International migration stock (% population) 2000 0.0877 0.0249 0.0220 -0.161
(0.623) (0.0748) (0.236) (-1.029)
GDP per capita 1998 (log) 0.387 1.051 -3.955*** -2.679
(0.157) (0.170) (-3.988) (-1.600)
Rural population (%) -0.00494 -0.0376 0.0813* 0.114*
(-0.0690) (-0.151) (1.950) (1.764)
Agricultural production per capita 1990 (log) -0.688 -4.999 2.938 2.264
(-0.131) (-0.235) (0.609) (0.371)
Trade openess 0.0115 -0.00369 -0.0318 0.00621
(0.213) (-0.0349) (-1.441) (0.189)
Law&Order -0.374 -1.600 -0.377 -0.101





R̂× F̂D -0.0159 -0.00915
(-1.533) (-0.223)
Remittances (%PIB) -0.167 -0.609**
(-1.165) (-2.088)
Private credit (%PIB) 0.0259 -0.0553
(0.789) (-0.707)
Remittances×Private credit 0.00308 0.0186*
(0.592) (1.749)
Constant -4.128 12.32 20.89 10.84
(-0.198) (0.0904) (1.066) (0.389)
Number of observations 82 82 95 82
R2 0.475 0.645 0.911 0.898
Note : Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Remittances, credit and the interaction of the two, are instrumented
by the predictions of remittances (R̂), credit (F̂D) and by the product of these two predictions (R̂ × F̂D). These
predictions are obtained from the regressions presented in Table 2. Regional dummies are included in all regressions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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